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Abstract 
Drinking water supply involves a complex network of natural and man-made infrastructure 
necessary to capture, store, convey, treat, and discharge this necessary resource. Each component 
in this “cloud to tap” supply chain faces a host of threats such as systemic decay, population 
change, natural disaster, cyber and physical attacks, and/or contamination incidents. Evaluating 
and quantifying the near- and long-term implications of these stressors on the risk and resilience 
of the current water infrastructure system has historically been implemented at the local utility 
level. The Drinking Water Resilience Project (DWRP), a collaboration between the Department 
of Homeland Security, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratories, 
the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs (UCCS), and the University of Tennessee (UT) is 
aimed at providing a more comprehensive view of water utility risk and resilience. Specifically, 
Sandia’s effort will develop an infrastructure risk assessment tool to support self-assessment by 
the asset owner/operator using an interactive, data-rich, web-based application that guides the user 
through the analysis. The associated analysis is intended to be simple, consistent and 
comparable. This facilitates the sharing of results, in a secure environment, across multiple levels 
of government as the need requires. This sharing helps place individual utility results in the broader 
context of risk borne by similar utilities across the U.S. Shared analysis also helps identify and 
address issues with assets and resources shared across multiple utilities. Most importantly, risks 
and mitigating measures can be prioritized across different geographic scales to aid funding 
decisions made at levels beyond the capacity of a single utility. A demonstration of the framework 
will be given along with demonstration results from several public utilities. 
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“There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and 
networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United 
States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination thereof (DHS 2016).”  
The value of our nation’s critical infrastructure is particularly evident when it is 
compromised by disaster. The U.S. has sustained 196 weather and climate disasters since 1980 
where overall damages/costs reached or exceeded $1 billion (including CPI adjustment to 2016). 
The total cost of these 196 events exceeds $1.1 trillion (NOAA 2016). Beyond such disasters, 
failure to maintain and grow our infrastructure is estimated to cost our economy in excess of $195 
billion per year in lost efficiencies (Sherradan and Henry, 2011). Safeguarding infrastructure from 
internal and external attack also looms large as indicated by cyber-attacks costing the average 
American firm $15.4 million per year (Hewlett Packard 2015). Toward these challenges, President 
Clinton established the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection with the task 
to review the vulnerabilities and threats facing U.S. infrastructures, asses the risks and propose a 
long-term strategy to assure the nation’s critical infrastructure in the coming decades (1997). The 
events of 9/11 intensified urgency in this matter with President Bush establishing, in 2003, a 
national strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Bush 
2003). 
Central to protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure is the development of 
methodologies for prioritizing action and supporting resource allocation decisions associated with 
risk-reduction initiatives. The foundation for such analysis was established in the early 1970’s in 
the context of the nuclear power industry (Apostolakis 2004). Following the attacks of September 
11, 2001 the American Society of Mechanical Engineers was requested to develop a consistent 
risk assessment methodology to permit direct comparison within and across industry sectors. The 
Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) process was developed 
around a seven-step methodology that enables asset managers to analyze their risk and risk-
reduction options. Consistent with the RAMCAP framework, sector-specific applications soon 
followed for nuclear power plants, radioactive waste transportation and storage, petroleum 
refineries, chemical manufacturing plants, LNG off-loading terminal, dams and locks, and water 
and wastewater systems. The 2002 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act, which required all water utilities serving more than 3,300 people to perform security 
vulnerability assessments, accelerated application within the drinking water sector. A sector 
specific framework was developed by the American Water Works Association, J100 standard for 
Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems. Specific applications were 
also adapted including the Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT™), the Security and 
 
Environmental Management System (SEMS™), and the Risk Assessment Methodology-Water 
(RAM-W).  
The difficulties in developing a risk-based framework for prioritizing risk-reduction 
actions are daunting, largely due to the great uncertainties in understanding the suite of threats. In 
2008 the U.S. Congress asked the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies 
to review and assess the activities of the Department of Homeland Security related to risk analysis 
(P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008). While they found the conceptual 
framework for risk analysis (risk is a function of threat (T), vulnerability (V), and consequence 
(C), or R = f(T,V,C)) to be appropriate for decomposing risk and organizing information they 
questioned its ability for supporting decision making because its validity and reliability were 
untested (National Research Council, 2010). One area in which such testing is lacking is related to 
evaluation of the inter-comparability of results across different utilities. Specifically, to what 
extent does bias in the utility-centric risk assessment impact the inter-comparability of results with 
other utilities. Bias is introduced through over or underestimating the probability of a threat, the 
vulnerability to a given threat, failing to identify a critical threat, or through differences in 
calculating associated consequences. Such bias could significantly skew results leading to mis-
prioritization of action. 
Here we present a web-based risk assessment framework that promotes the anonymous 
sharing of results among utilities of similar character. The constructed framework was 
demonstrated for three water utilities. Results were compared across utilities and were also 
combined with risk assessment results from four other utilities collected using a different risk 
assessment application by a different set of analysts. Comparison of the results identifies five 
values realized by a shared risk assessment framework: 
1. Helps recognize and correct bias in analyses, 
2. Helps recognize “unknown, unknowns”, that is, helps analysts identify threat, 
vulnerabilities, or consequences they would otherwise have overlooked, 
3. Provides a means of self-assessment and benchmarking for the local utility 
4. Provides opportunity to expand analysis to include shared assets and/or threats across 
multiple utilities, and 
5. Helps prioritize actions beyond the scale of a single utility. 
Below we discuss the basic approach taken to developing the framework and conducting 
the utility demonstrations. Results are then reviewed, focusing largely in understanding the 
differences and biases across the seven utility risk assessments. Finally, the results are discussed 





The DWRP framework is based on systems theory (e.g., Maani and Cavana, 2002) and 
uses the concepts of impacts, systems, and threats as its basis for implementation. This is in 
contrast to the J-100 standard that uses consequences, assets, and threats. The systems’ approach 
helps promote the idea of a water utility as a system of systems, where the underlying systems are 
a collection of parts that interact with one another to function as a ‘whole’. It is a top-down 
approach that changes the fundamental question being asked when performing a RA from “what 
happens if ‘Asset A’ fails” to “what impacts are we most worried about and what systems need to 
fail to produce that impact?” (Figure 1). This approach also supports rapid execution of the RA by 
reducing the tendency to focus on details that are not important for a RA of this type. 
While the concepts of impacts, systems, and threats are analogous to consequences, assets, 
and threats, there are important distinctions. Impacts within the DWRP framework are calculated 
using a minimal amount of input from the user. This is to standardize and normalize the impacts 
across different utilities and regions to allow for meaningful comparisons and identification of 
bias. Systems can be thought of a collection of assets that collectively perform a vital role in the 
collection, treatment, and delivery of water to the consumer. Likewise, threats within the DWRP 
framework are consolidated at a coarser resolution and are meant to describe the broad categories 
of threats to a utility as opposed to specific descriptors that are part of the J-100 standard. 
The intent is to remain consistent with the J-100 standard while offering a means of 
normalizing data so that results from different utilities can be consistently compared. Ideally, one 
would have already completed a J-100 RA and then port results of the highest risk features into 
the DWRP framework. It is important to note that the DWRP framework is not meant to be a 
substitute for a J-100 RA but rather a complement to a J-100 RA that will provide greater insight 
into the underlying risks and aid the user in identifying previously unknown risks or risks that are 
the result of shared systems and/or shared threats. 
 
Figure 1. The systems approach is used to put an emphasis on high level assessments that 
examine the consequences and impacted systems first. 
 
Systems 
The systems defined in the DWRP framework are listed in Table 1. This framework was 
implemented within a user-friendly, interactive software application. Within the list is the entire 
working structure of a water utility, including the non-physical aspects such as employees and/or 
knowledge base. When a user enters a system into the framework, they are presented with a 
dropdown list of Table 1 to categorize the system as well as a blank line to enter a more specific 
description. For instance, a user may select ‘Treatment’ as the system, but enter the name of a key 
pump within the treatment plant as the descriptor. This aids in comparing across utilities in that it 
is the system outage and the impacts of that outage that are important as opposed to the details of 
the failure within a system (i.e., at the comparison level, it is more relevant to know that a treatment 
plant is out for 7 days as opposed to a specific pump within the treatment plant is out). It also 
provides another level of protection for the individual utilities in that vulnerable assets cannot be 
identified by users outside their own utility. From the utility point of view, placing the focus at the 
systems level allows for a more rapid execution of the RA by avoiding the details of a J-100 
assessment while also encouraging the user to look at their utility from a different perspective to 
better identify and prioritize the highest risks. 
 
 
Table 1. List of systems defined in the framework. 
System Name Description 
Employees Ability to get to work, labor market with adequate skill set 
Finished Water Distribution Distribution between final treatment and the consumer 
Information Technologies SCADA systems, analysis, monitoring, data 
Knowledge Base Experienced employees, institutional knowledge 
Maintenance and 
Administration 
Administration services, building maintenance, computer 
systems 
Operations and Maintenance Water system operations and maintenance 
Raw Water Conveyance Conveyance between source water intake and treatment plant 
Source Water Water quality and availability 
Source Water Infrastructure Systems to collect water from source 
Storage Reservoirs and tanks for storage of raw, treated, or used water 
Treatment Treatment facilities for treating raw water 




Impacts within the DWRP framework are split into three categories; community disruption, 
health and safety, and financial (Table 2). Community disruption costs are the costs borne by the 
local community due to a failure of the utility to deliver water. The user is responsible for four 
inputs when describing the community disruption costs; their total number of connections, the 
outage time, the percent of their total demand served by the failed system, and the percent of the 
unmet demand caused by the failure. The calculation is based on the metropolitan gross domestic 
product (expressed as GDP/person/day), which is predefined in the framework by metropolitan 
area. The use of the metropolitan GDP normalizes the community impacts across regional and 
national scales. 
Health and safety impacts are impacts that cause deaths or illnesses to consumers, 
employees, and/or other users of the utilities systems (e.g., boaters on a utility-owned reservoir). 
The H&S impact calculation is the number of deaths times the value of a statistical life (VSL) plus 
the number of illnesses times the value of a statistical injury/illness (VSI). The VSL and VSI ($9.4 
million and $0.94 million, respectively) are the most recent values recommended by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (Thomson and Monje, 2015). 
Financial impacts are those impacts borne directly by the utility and include lost revenue, 
repair costs, other costs. Lost revenue is revenue for the utility that is lost from not being able to 
deliver water or from an inability to bill the customer (such as might occur if a customer database 
became corrupted or a billing system failed). Repair costs are the total costs for bringing the failed 
system back to working order, including equipment costs and labor costs. Other costs are meant to 
capture things like legal costs, loss of customer confidence, and the like. To calculate the financial 
impacts, customers are required to enter the total number of connections, the outage time, the 
percent of the total demand served by the failed system, the percent of the unmet demand caused 
by the failure, the average daily water service (in millions of gallons per day), and the average 
water rate (usually dollars per 1000 gallons). 
Table 2. Impact categories. Variables refer to: tout = outage time [days], ncust = number of hookups, 
DS = % of total demand served, DU = % unmet demand, GDP = metropolitan GDP 
[GDP/person/day], nD = number of deaths, VSL = value of a statistical life, nI = number of illnesses 
or injuries, VSI = value of a statistical illness/injury, S = average daily service [MGD], r = average 
water rate [$/1000 gal], Rc = repair costs [$], Oc = other costs [$]. Variables in red are supplied by 
the user. Other variables are provided by the framework. Note that the inputs needed to calculate 
the community disruption impact are also used to calculate the financial impact. 
Impact Category Description Calculation 
Community 
Disruption 
Costs borne by the 
local community 
𝐼𝐶𝐷 = 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 × 𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡 × 𝐷𝑠 × 𝐷𝑢 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
Health and Safety Deaths and illness or 
injury 
𝐼𝐻𝑆 = 𝑛𝐷 × 𝑉𝑆𝐿 + 𝑛𝐼 × 𝑉𝑆𝐼 
 
Financial Costs borne by the 
utility 
𝐼𝑓 = 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 × 𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡 × 𝐷𝑠 × 𝐷𝑢 × 𝑆̅ × 𝑟 + 𝑅𝑐
+ 𝑂𝑐 
 
A key difference between the DWRP framework and the J-100 standard is the manner in 
which vulnerability is handled. Vulnerability within J-100 can be described as the percentage of 
time a threat creates an impact once it occurs. A classic example is a direct attack on a facility 
where the probability of the attack is different than the probability of an attack being successful. 
A heavily fortified facility may have a high probability of attack (i.e., it often gets attacked) but a 
low vulnerability (the probability of an attack being successful is low). The DWRP framework 
assumes that for natural threats, the vulnerability will be one. In other words, we are only interested 
in natural threats the produce some kind of impact. For other threats, such as direct attack, the 
vulnerability is included in the Du variable, the percent unmet demand. 
Threats 
Like the list of systems, threats have been consolidated to a coarser resolution than used in 
the J-100 standard to aid in the rapid execution of the RA and to keep the focus at a higher level. 
Within the DWRP framework, the user chooses a threat based on a dropdown list of the threats 
listed in Table 3 and then provides a more detailed description if desired. This again helps protect 
individual utilities since it is only the threat category and not the detailed description that is 
compared across utilities (e.g., there is a big difference between knowing the risk is from a direct 





Table 3. List of threats used in the DWRP framework. 
Aging Infrastructure Natural – Drought 
Contamination Natural – Earthquake 
Direct Attack Natural – Flood 
Human Error Natural – Hurricane 
Loss of Customers Natural – Ice Storm 
Loss of Employees Natural – Tornado 
Loss of Suppliers Natural – Tsunami 
Loss of Utilities Natural – Wildfire 
Other Sabotage – Cyber 
 
 Sabotage – Physical 
Probabilities for the natural threats are automatically provided to the user based on the 
location of the utility while the other threats use default values based on historical values. The user 
can override the probability of a threat occurring if the default value seems unreasonable or to 
perform sensitivity analysis or scenario testing. 
Implementation 
To execute the DWRP framework, a user begins by inputting descriptive information about 
their utility, including the location, number of customers (ncust), average daily service (S), and the 
average charge rate (r). Then, the user inputs the system-threat pairs. When inputting the system-
threat pairs, it is important to note that a single system may have many threats and that a single 
threat may impact many systems. The framework is setup to handle this. For each system-threat 
pair, the variables needed to calculate the impacts are also entered. 
Once entered, the system calculates the system-threat risk within each impact category and 
then uses a matrix approach to calculate other risk such as the total risk to a system across all 
threats, total risk from a threat across all systems, or total risk to the utility across all systems and 
threats. Mathematically, the system threat risks for the community disruption, health and safety, 
and financial impact categories are calculated using the appropriate version of equation [1]: 
(𝑅𝐶𝐷)𝑖,𝑗 = (𝐼𝐶𝐷)𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑝𝑗 
(𝑅𝐻𝑆)𝑖,𝑗 = (𝐼𝐻𝑆)𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑝𝑗 
(𝑅𝐹)𝑖,𝑗 = (𝐼𝐹)𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑝𝑗 
[1] 
 
where R is the risk, I are the impacts calculated from Table 2, and p is the probability of the threat 
occurring. The subscripts, i,j, refer to the system and threat, thus R represents the risk to system i 
from threat j. 
The total risk to a system is then calculated by summing across all risks for that system: 
𝑅𝑖 =∑(𝑅𝐶𝐷)𝑖,𝑗 + (𝑅𝐻𝑆)𝑖,𝑗
𝑛𝑇
𝑗=1
+ (𝑅𝐹)𝑖,𝑗 [2] 
 
where Ri is the total risk to a system across all threats, and nT is the number of threats. Likewise, 
the risk to a utility from a single threat is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑗 =∑(𝑅𝐶𝐷)𝑖,𝑗 + (𝑅𝐻𝑆)𝑖,𝑗
𝑛𝑆
𝑖=1
+ (𝑅𝐹)𝑖,𝑗 [3] 
 
 
where Rj is the total risk to the utility from a single threat and nS is the number of systems. The 






As will be discussed in the results section, this ability to look at risk from the system, threat, 
or utility level provides a means of identifying bias when compared to other utilities and helps the 
user better understand their key vulnerabilities and risks. 
Utility Demonstrations 
In person utility demonstrations were conducted using the DWRP Framework to get 
feedback on the value of the approach, the usability of the interface, and to obtain real world data 
to run the comparisons. The demonstrations were conducted for three different water utilities, one 
situated in the Central U.S., one in the South, and one in the West. The size of the utilities varied 
from 65,000 to 900,000 customers served and average daily deliveries ranged from 32 to 100 
MGD. Two of the participating utilities had previously completed a full-scale J-100 risk 
assessment of their system using VSAT. The third utility has a designated team that continuously 
performs risk assessments as part of their asset management process. The goal was not to replicate 
their past risk assessments but rather to map the highest level concerns into a uniform framework 
that allowed comparison with other utilities. 
During the in-person demonstrations, data from their past risk assessment exercises such 
as individual threat-asset pairs, were entered into the framework. Not all asset-threat pairs were 
entered, rather only those that are of greatest concern to the utility—only those that “keep the 
managers up at night.” As describe above, consequence and risk are automatically calculated by 
the framework. The face-to-face demonstrations took less than a day to complete in each case. 
To supplement the face-to-face demonstrations, data were obtained from four other J-100 
risk assessments. Two utilities were from the Central U.S., one from the South and one from the 
West. Populations served and average daily deliveries ranged 135,000 to 460,000 and 33 to 120 
MGD, respectively. All four assessments were conducted by the same consulting firm working 
directly with personnel from each of the four utilities and were provided to the research team in a 
sanitized manner to maintain anonymity. The data (e.g., threat-asset pairs, disruption times, 
damage costs) were input into the framework where the risks were calculated.  
Results 
The three in-person demonstrations and the four anonymous data sets provide seven real-
world estimations of risk using the DWRP Framework. In the discussions and figures that follow, 
the four anonymous data sets are referred to as East 1, East 2, Central 1, and West 1, while the 
three in-person demonstration utilities are referred to as Central 2, South 1, and West 2. 
 
Consistency 
The face-to-face demonstrations provided insight into how familiar each utility was with 
the risk assessment process as well as the results of their own risk assessment. For the two utilities 
that had completed a J-100 RA, it was apparent that the personnel in the room were generally 
familiar with the RA process but not so familiar with the details of their results. In both cases, the 
people who actually performed the RA were present but were not able to quickly and easily find 
the data necessary for input into the DWRP Framework. The third face-to-face demonstration had 
the benefit of several employees who worked full-time doing RA and RA related tasks so their 
knowledge of the required data was much greater than the other utilities. 
The lack of familiarity of the results of their own RA’s offers an interesting conclusion: for 
utilities that lack the resources to address and consider risk on a regular basis, the value of 
performing a RA may be lost or greatly diminished. This is not to say that their VSAT RA’s were 
not completed well, they were (and one could argue that they were completed very well), but rather 
that if the utility lacks the means to analyze the results and translate those results into useful action, 
the value of that RA is lost. 
Another interesting aspect of the risk assessments was the variability in how the 
probabilities and consequences were calculated. Two utilities categorized the probability of a 
threat occurring (e.g., low, medium, high, very high) and one of those also used set criteria to 
categorize the consequence on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being ‘extreme’ consequences. The latter 
approach allows for the creation of a risk table that ranks risk based on where it falls in the table 
(Table 4). While this approach is useful for identifying assets with high risk, it does not allow for 
prioritizing within a risk category or for comparing risk from different utilities. For the utilities 
that used this approach, a ‘translation’ between each category and its numerical value had to be 
agreed upon before their data could be put in the DWRP Framework. 
A final observation from the face-to-face demonstrations is that the perception of risk, and 
more specifically, the perceptions of the threats and their likelihood, varies considerably from 
utility to utility. As a rough generalization, one utility emphasized aging infrastructure and 
community disruption risk, another emphasized operations and financial risk, and the third 
emphasized security and financial risk. The reason for this stems from the set of issues that a utility 
is facing at the moment or has faced in the recent past. For instance, the utility that emphasized 
security had documented an attempt to hack their computer systems. Their work to address cyber 
security creates a natural tendency to look at other security issues within their system. This type 
of dynamic played out in varying degrees across all three demonstrations. 
Table 4. Example of risk assessment ranking table using categories of probability (likelihood) and 
consequence. 
  Consequence 





















Medium Medium High 
3 Low Low High High Extreme 
4 Low Medium High Extreme Extreme 
5 Low Medium High Extreme Extreme 
 
Data Comparison 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the cumulative probability distribution of risk 
for each utility across each impact category as well as for the total risk. This shows that probability 
that the risk associated with a system-threat pair will be lower than a given risk. The plot for the 
health and safety risk has only three utilities because the other utilities reported no risk in that 
category. Note that the x-axis (risk axis) is logarithmic, indicating a wide range of reported risks. 
From the plots, it is evident that the distribution of risk is similar across the utilities 
although outliers can be seen. West 1 has the highest maximum risk for a single system-threat pair 
at $209 billion, which was for a direct attack on an administration building that caused a significant 
number of deaths and injuries. This is reflected by the high maximum value for West 1 in the 
Health and Safety plot. The lowest maximum total risk is $216,000 for Central 2, for physical-
sabotage on their source water intake that causes a community disruption. 
South 1 and West 2 show most of their risk is to the right of the blue dotted line, which 
represents the average across all utilities, indicating that they may be over estimating their impacts 
and/or probabilities as compared to the other utilities. This is clearly driven by the financial risk 
as South 1 and West 2 are also to the right of the ‘All Utilities’ line in that plot. On the other end 
of the spectrum, East 2 is to the left of the ‘All Utilities’ line in the Financial Risk plot indicating 
that they may be underestimating their repair costs or other costs. Again, the goal with the 
comparisons is to allow a utility to look at other risk assessments in a manner that may cause them 
to rethink, or at least, re-check their assessments. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Cumulative probability distributions for the risk associated with each impact category and 
the total risk. The ‘All Utilities’ line represents the average risk across all utilities. 
 
Another way to compare the utilities is to look at the percentage of the total number of 
occurrences across all utilities that a utility addresses a particular system or threat (Figure 3). The 
percentages are the percentages of the total. For example the first bar in the left hand plot of Figure 
3 shows that the risk assessment for West 1 contains approximately 67% of the system-threat pairs 
that include employees as the system, with West 2 containing the other 33%. The other utilities do 
not address risk for the employee system category. This concept is the same for the right hand plot 
too. 
By looking at these plots, a utility may realize that they have missed a key system or threat. 
For instance, on the threat side, East 1 is the only utility to address the risk associated with a ‘Loss 
of Suppliers’. Noting this may cause another utility to address this when they otherwise might have 
over looked it. 
Figure 4 is the same as Figure 3 but the percentages are based on the total risk across all 
utilities and not the number of occurrences. Referring back to the West 1 and West 2 case for the 
Employee system category, one can note that while West 1 contains 67% of the occurrences of the 
Employee category, West 2 (from Figure 4) contains 98% of the risk. A similar dynamic can be 
seen with respect to the Flood threat where East 2 contains approximately 55% of the instances 
where Flood is listed as a threat, but only 2% of the risk associated with flooding.  
Figure 3. Percentage of occurrence for systems and threats. The percentage is based on the total 






The risk assessments conduced for the seven water utilities yielded comparatively different 
results. Noted were differences in the overall distribution of risk (comparison of the CDFs), the 
mix of assets and threats considered and the priority risks identified by each utility (highest ranking 
threat-asset pairs).There are two basic reasons for the noted differences. First, some of the 
differences are real given the unique age, design and complexity of their infrastructure, their 
geographic location and thus exposure to different natural threats, prior efforts to harden their 
utility against identified threats, and the risk culture of the utility. Second, some difference was 
introduced into the analysis by bias. Bias resulted from the use of different analytical platforms, 
different analyst with differing perceptions of risk, and the limited knowledge and experience of 
the analysis team resulting in the failure to capture the full spectrum of risk.  
Ideally, statistical analysis could be used to distinguish bias from the actual risk profile; 
unfortunately, a population of seven utilities was insufficient to accomplish this. Although there 
was insufficient data to statistically distinguish bias from the actual risk profile, results bear out 
the fact that bias exists. For example, the number of threat-asset pairs significantly differs across 
the seven utility assessments, thus biasing the lower tails of the distributions. Comparison of the 
threat-asset pairs for each of the utility RAs also reveals bias. Most systems (e.g., asset) and threats 
were included in three or fewer of the utility RAs although these systems and threats (except in 
the case of specific natural disasters) are largely common to all seven utilities. Also, several high 
Figure 4. Percentage of total risk for systems and threats. The percentage is based on the sum of 
total risk across all utilities for each system and threat. 
 
priority risks identified by a single utility are not recognized by other utilities even though they are 
likely to have application. Examples include the threat to employees from disgruntled customers 
and the passage of trunk water lines below important transportation corridors (i.e., highways or 
rail lines) that would have significant economic implications if the pipe failed. 
Value of Shared Analysis 
A web-based risk assessment framework that promotes the anonymous sharing of results 
among utilities of similar character offers a number of potential advantages, among these are 
assistance in recognizing and correcting bias; identification of “unknown, unknowns”; self-
assessment and benchmarking for the local utility; treatment of shared assets and/or threats across 
multiple utilities; and prioritization of actions beyond the scale of a single utility. 
Comparison of results across the seven water utilities clearly indicated the influence of bias 
on the analysis. This bias was the product of using different risk analysis applications as well as 
differences in risk perception among the various participants in the analysis. While it is recognized 
that bias is inherent to the process, there are steps that can be taken to minimize its effects. A single 
standardized web portal for guiding the RA, while being compatible with existing tools and 
processes (e.g., consistent with the J100 process and associated applications like VSAT or SEMS), 
would provide a consistent and unbiased procedure for managing the analysis process. It would 
also guarantee consistency in assumptions concerning threat probabilities, vulnerability estimates 
and quantification of consequences (much like the VSAT or SEMS applications provide for the 
water sector). Anonymous sharing of RA results would also provide a means of comparison, 
allowing analysts to identify where their results deviate from that of other similar utilities and thus 
evaluate whether the discrepancies are real or bias. As the database of utilities grows standardized 
statistical tests could be developed for automated identification of potential instances of bias.  
Another value of shared RA is the identification of unknown, unknowns; that is, threats, 
vulnerabilities, or consequences that would otherwise have been overlooked due to lack of 
experience or perception of the local team of analysts. An example involves the threat of a 
disgruntled customer attacking the billing office. While this is a threat that most all utilities would 
face only one utility identified this threat because they had experienced an upset customer bringing 
a gun into the administrative offices. Anonymous sharing of risk profiles would help utilities 
identify these unknown, unknowns by learning from the experiences of other utilities. As the 
database grows search algorithms could be developed to target and share such events with 
particular utilities, much like Amazon pairs potential customers with new products based on their 
buying habits. 
Shared RA also provides an effective means of self-assessment and benchmarking for the 
local utility. While the individual utility can get an indication of high versus low risk, utility 
leadership needs to place their results in context before deciding what, if anything, they need to do 
to change their situation. A national-normed view of risk would permit them to gauge how well 
(or poorly) they are doing relative to others in their cohort. This desire to know “where they stand” 
 
is not only an interesting fact, but can become a powerful driver when used by the utility to brief 
decision-makers when asking for the resources to reduce their high-priority risks. Decision makers 
understand high risk and typically become clearly motivated when this risk places them in an 
unfavorable light with respect to their peers. As actions are taken to reduce risk such nationally-
normed comparison gives the utility a benchmark against which they can measure improvement. 
Shared RA provides benefits beyond the scale of the single utility. Risk profiles aggregated at the 
metropolitan, county, state and national level would assist planning, prioritization and emergency 
preparedness beyond the community level. Such cooperation would help identify shared assets 
such as reservoirs or raw water conveyance systems. Associated risk profiles would change as the 
values of multiple utilities are aggregated, more accurately reflecting the value of the asset. 
Aggregation of risk across shared threats, particularly natural disasters, would likewise add value 
to regional emergency preparedness efforts. Equally important, sharing of risk data across different 
geographic regions would assist in effective prioritization of risk reduction actions. This is 
particularly important in the case of actions requiring resources beyond the capacity of the local 
utility, providing a means of targeting state and national assistance to the greatest need. 
Challenges to Broad Implementation 
While the value of a shared RA framework is apparent, there are several important concerns 
related to implementation. In particular is the perceived need for this tool relative to that of other 
initiatives. Threats to infrastructure systems are known and well understood by the utilities. 
Infrastructure managers deal with risk on a daily basis and are accustomed to the mental 
gymnastics to effectively deal with these risks and continue to protect the public. It is always the 
emerging risks that keep the sector awake at night. Thus any new tool needs to advance the research 
and application development of risk if it is to add value to the risk and resilience understanding 
and sustainability improvement to the utility. Utility leaders universally are supportive of 
investments that enhance the quality and safety of their systems. But history has taught that 
protection demands constant search for the next threat that must be handled. Without a clear sense 
that a new process or procedure is forward looking and adds to the basic mission of the utility, it 
will receive little enthusiasm or support.  
There must be a clear benefit to the utility to participate. Most utilities today are under-
staffed and over-worked. The flood of daily operating problems is exacerbated by ever growing 
governmental regulation, rising customer expectations, and an unrealistically low rate structure 
that cannot keep pace with the deterioration of the infrastructure. The post-911 vulnerability 
assessments that were mandated by EPA of all water systems with over 3,300 connections carried 
with it a $200,000 stipend. Today we are asking water utilities to complete a probability-based risk 
assessment using their own funding. Thus, for the average utility to invest the time and resources 
necessary to produce a meaningful, thoughtful risk assessment, there must be something tangible 
in it for them. 
 
Utilities have a long and vocal history of refusing to share information, especially with 
governmental entities that may not have the most robust of track records for protecting this 
sensitive information. For a utility to even consider participating in a risk assessment program in 
which their data would be exposed in any form, evokes questions such as: 
a) What is the clear and convincing process that their data is to be protected? 
b) Who will have access to the data? 
c) Will the utilities have the option to control who has access to their data? 
d) Will the utility be notified whenever anyone accesses their data? 
Without convincing reassurances, there is only limited hope that utilities will feel comfortable 
to sharing their data. There is little trust that any governmental entity is in the position to protect 
this information from political misuse. If there is to be a repository of risk assessment information 
that is specifically tied to any utility, it must be with a trusted agent. Proper protocols must be 
developed and then translated through strong software design to assure the guarded access to this 
information. When accessed by state or federal governments, the agency accessing the data must 
be authorized and then be limited to only that data specifically needed to meet an agreed program. 
Finally, the owner of the information must have a way to be informed of who accessed their data, 
when it was accessed, how much was accessed, and to what purpose the data will be applied. 
Summary 
Here we demonstrate a web-based risk assessment framework that promotes the 
anonymous sharing of results among utilities of similar character. The constructed framework was 
demonstrated for three water utilities. Results were compared across utilities and were also 
combined with risk assessment results from four other utilities collected using a different risk 
assessment application by a different set of analysts. Although there was insufficient data to 
statistically distinguish bias from the actual risk profile, results bear out the fact that bias exists 
among the seven risk assessments. Bias resulted from the use of different analytical platforms, 
different analyst with differing perceptions of risk, and the limited knowledge and experience of 
the analysis team resulting in the failure to capture the full spectrum of risk. 
A web-based risk assessment framework that promotes the anonymous sharing of results 
among utilities of similar character offers a number of potential advantages, among these are 
assistance in recognizing and correcting bias; identification of “unknown, unknowns”; self-
assessment and benchmarking for the local utility; treatment of shared assets and/or threats across 
multiple utilities; and prioritization of actions beyond the scale of a single utility. While the value 
of a shared RA framework is apparent, there are several important concerns related to 
implementation. Without a clear sense that shared RA is forward looking and adds to the basic 
mission of the utility, it will receive little enthusiasm or support as utilities are constantly 
bombarded by new regulation and risk reduction initiatives.  Beyond this there must be a clear 
benefit to the utility to participate, as utilities today are under-staffed and over-worked. And, 
 
finally there must be demonstrated ability and assurance that utility data will be protected from 
unintended access or misuse. 
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